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Résumé : Les théories de la mécanique quantique et de la gravité quantique
exigent-elles que l’espace-temps soit un trait fondamental de bas niveau, ou
l’espace-temps peut-il être conçu comme un élément émergent de ces théories ?
Tandis que plusieurs commentateurs ont émis de sérieux doutes sur l’idée de
se dispenser de l’arrière-plan d’un espace-temps standard, nous ferons valoir
qu’une défense de ces interprétations de l’espace-temps émergeant des hypo-
thèses de la mécanique et de la gravité quantiques peut être conduite soit par
inférence à la meilleure explication, soit en mobilisant une autre stratégie. De
plus, on montrera que l’idée que l’espace et le temps peuvent émerger d’un
niveau du réel tout à fait différent et non spatiotemporel a des précédents
historiques variés, en particulier aux xviie et xviiie siècles. Cette prise de
conscience peut aider à dissiper une partie du mystère associé à ces types
d’hypothèses.
Abstract: Do theories of quantum mechanics and quantum gravity require
spacetime to be a basic ground-level feature, or can spacetime be seen as
an emergent element of these theories? While several commentators have
raised serious doubts about the prospects of forgoing the standard spacetime
backdrop, we will argue that a defence of these emergent spacetime interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics and quantum gravity hypotheses can be made
whether as an inference as to what the best explanation is or using another
strategy. Furthermore, the idea that space and time can arise from a quite
different, non-spatiotemporal level of reality will be shown to have various
historical precedents, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
This realization may help dispel some of the mystery associated with these
types of hypotheses.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 20(3), 2016, 149–166.
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1 Introduction
Although string theory, loop quantum gravity (LQG), and a host of other
hypotheses that advance an alternative foundation for theoretical physics are
often criticized on the (somewhat prosaic) grounds that there is little or
no supporting evidence, several commentators have put forward the more
ambitious claim that a certain class of these hypotheses are problematic,
and potentially incoherent, both conceptually and empirically. In particular,
the skeptical assessment is aimed at those quantum gravity (QG) strategies,
and interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM), that posit an underlying
ontology that does not possess the 4-dimensional spacetime properties, chiefly
metrical and topological, associated with twentieth century field theories,
such as general relativity (GR). Rather, these QG theories claim that the
spacetime structures employed by GR and other higher level field theories
emerge from the non-spacetime QG entities and processes posited at a more
fundamental ontological level. Hereafter, a “non-spacetime” theory denotes
a QG proposal (or QM interpretation) that does not take the continuous, 4-
dimensional metrical and topological structure of spacetime as fundamental.
The goals of this essay are as follows. In section 2, the arguments against these
non-spacetime QG hypotheses will be shown to be limited in various ways, and,
with respect to structural realism, it will be argued that both the ontic and the
epistemic versions are equally legitimate interpretations. Specifically, Huggett
& Wüthrich have provided a defense of these non-spacetime QG hypotheses
against criticisms raised by Maudlin, and this defense will be extended to
rebuff similar objections developed by Esfeld & Lam, as well as challenge the
latter’s interpretation of the relevant form of structural realism that applies to
non-spatiotemporal hypotheses. In section 3, more importantly, the allegation
that a non-spacetime ontology is a radical departure from established scientific
thought will be challenged through examining similar ideas and strategies from
the history of natural philosophy, in particular, Leibniz’ conception of ubeity
and its role in his monadic conception of the material world’s emergence.
2 Beables and locality: Why worry?
Overall, several commentators would appear to reject these non-spacetime QG
proposals, insisting that “it is unclear how to make sense of concrete physical
entities that are not in spacetime and of the notion of ontological emergence
that is involved” [Lam & Esfeld 2013, 287].1 In line with similar criticisms
put forward earlier by Maudlin against configuration space interpretations
of QM (but applicable to QG as well, see below) [Maudlin 2007], Bell’s
1. Lam & Esfeld confine their study to canonical QG theories, specifically, ge-
ometrodynamics and LQG, but we will include a host of other QG and non-QG
proposals in our discussion as well.
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notion of a “local beable” is adopted by Lam & Esfeld to counter these non-
spacetime QG proposals, see [Bell 1987, 234]. A “beable” refers to, in this
case, the fundamental objects of a theory’s ontology, whereas a “local beable”
is that object’s association—locality—within a definite spacetime region. The
problem, put roughly, is that non-spatiotemporal entities are not localizable,
or their localization has yet to be determined, and this predicament has lead
Maudlin, as well as Lam & Esfeld, to render a negative verdict on these
non-spacetime hypotheses. On Maudlin’s estimation, “local beables do not
merely exist: they exist somewhere” [Maudlin 2007, 3157], so it follows that
any theory which admits beables that cannot be localized does not achieve
“physical salience” [Maudlin 2007, 3167]. Likewise, Lam & Esfeld declare that
“there are no beables without local beables” [Lam & Esfeld 2013, 290].
Viewed in historical context, the local beables quandary can be seen as a
skirmish in the larger battle over the relationship between spacetime physics
and matter/field theory, i.e., whether spacetime relationships are derived from,
or are independent of, the dynamical processes at the microphysical level. This
debate need not involve the age old absolute/substantival versus relationism
question, and it is not restricted to QG, but it has been a major issue in the
development of twentieth century physics, and in the relationship between
QM and GR in particular. According to Friedman, “spacetime physics,
on Einstein’s view, must precede, and then constrain, the development of
microphysics” [Friedman 2013, 195], although many have drawn the opposite
conclusion, e.g., Brown’s recent text that regards the “geometrical structures
of Minkowski space-time as parasitic on the relativistic properties of the
dynamical matter fields” [Brown 2005, 100].
2.1 Quantum mechanics and spacetime
A major part of Lam & Esfeld’s “no local beables” argument against non-
spacetime QG theories is based on their interpretation of the role of spacetime
in quantum mechanics. Put briefly, they argue that non-seperability and/or
entanglement in QM, in both the non-relativistic and quantum field theory
settings, depend crucially on spacetime, thus QG theories (which are QM-
based) face potentially insurmountable difficulties.
These allegations raise legitimate concerns, it must be admitted, but they
also involve questionable assumptions, as the work of Dieks helps to make clear
[Dieks 2001]. First, only some interpretations of non-relativistic QM posit
spatiotemporal positions (trajectories) for quantum systems, e.g., Bohmian
mechanics, whereas the more traditional interpretation first developed by
Bohr does not. Under the Copenhagen interpretations, and its Hilbert space
formalism, the complementarity of position and momentum entails that a
quantum system can lack a spacetime position under some experimental
arrangements. As Dieks notes:
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[Q]uantum mechanics is not a spacetime theory. The Hilbert
space formalism is self-sufficient, and does not need a spacetime
manifold as a background. The quantum-mechanical states are
defined directly as elements of a Hilbert space. Furthermore,
it is possible to interpret these abstract mathematical states
in terms of systems which do not always possess positions.2
[Dieks 2001, 232]
Turning to quantum field theory (QFT), there have been several interpreta-
tions of algebraic QFT that forsake the point manifold of Minkowski spacetime
for a reconstruction based on overlapping sets of subalgebras that represent
physical subsystems, see, e.g., [Bannier 1994], [Schroer &Wiesbrock 2000], and
[Dieks 2000]. These strategies can be seen as favouring a sophisticated rela-
tionist or property interpretation of QFT since the point manifold is replaced
(or recaptured) by a particular ordering of these physical subsystems—but,
more generally, these algebraic QFT constructions are akin to non-spacetime
QG hypotheses in the sense that the relevant structures of the physical
subsystem are encoded in a Hilbert space. That is, a Hilbert space structure,
which possesses neither manifold nor metric, gives rise to QFT’s Minkowski
spacetime in a supervenience or emergence fashion. Accordingly, if the details
can be worked out, these interpretations of QM and QFT do not necessitate
spacetime at the foundational level. Likewise, the advocates of “wave-function
realism”, such as [Albert 1996] and [Ney 2012], claim that the complex-valued
3N -dimensional configuration space (for an N -particle quantum theory) is
the fundamental space, with the 3-dimensional space of macrolevel processes
(and common experience) either emergent or, in Albert’s words, “illusory”
[Albert 1996, 277]. To sum up, the idea that macrolevel spacetime emerges
in some manner from a deeper and quite different level of reality has gained
many advocates, hence the claim that QM and the related QM-based theories
(QFT, QG) require the standard spacetime backdrop common to classical and
relativistic physics is itself a contentious claim.
2.2 Non-spacetime theories and inference to the best
explanation
While both Lam & Esfeld and Maudlin admit the possibility of constructing
successful non-spacetime QG theories, Maudlin insists that these proposals
lack “physical salience” relative to those approaches that retain the standard
2. On Dieks’s analysis, which rejects substantivalism for a property theory or a
sophisticated relationist proposal, “one should take the Hilbert space formalism as
basic. All features which are traditionally associated with attributes of space should
be distilled from this Hilbert space description. Obviously, Hilbert space is here not
seen as something substantial, replacing absolute space, but rather as a mathematical
device with the aid of which we give a systematical account of physical properties
and their evolution” [Dieks 2001, 235].
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background spacetime structure [Lam & Esfeld 2013, 291], [Maudlin 2007,
3160]. Maudlin concludes that non-spacetime interpretations of QM depend
crucially on what
a derivation of something isomorphic to local structure would
look like, where the derived structure deserves to be regarded as
physically salient (rather then merely mathematically definable).
Until we know how to identify physically serious derivative struc-
ture, it is not clear how to implement [a non-spacetime] strategy.
[Maudlin 2007, 3161]
Huggett & Wüthrich interpret this passage as invoking a form of “empirical
incoherence” argument, presumably, in the sense that the evidence for such a
theory would be local, and thus inconsistent with non-local beables [Huggett
& Wüthrich 2013, 277]. On Huggett & Wüthrich’s estimate, this kind
of reasoning simply begs the question, and they offer a blueprint for how
understand the scheme underlying spacetime emergence:
[S]uppose we have a theory, T (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn), of some non-
spatiotemporal entities, τ1, τ2, . . . , τn, and a demonstration that,
given suitable idealizations, some formal structure can be de-
rived in which certain variables are functionally related just as
phenomenal—‘old’—spacetime quantities. [...] [T]he τs are de-
fined to be the unique collection of things satisfying the theory,
such that the structure in question veridically represents the spa-
tiotemporal quantities. So, by definition, if the τs exist, there is no
further question of whether spacetime emerges from them, since
they just are (in part) the things from which spacetime emerges.
[Huggett & Wüthrich 2013, 284, original italics]
In short, an ontology gains physical salience if it successfully “saves the
phenomena”, in this case, by deriving macrolevel spacetime from a more
fundamental microlevel ontology that is not spatiotemporal.
From a slightly different angle, perhaps the same point can be expressed
as an “inference to the best explanation”: if a non-spacetime QG theory
can be formulated that integrates QM and GR—a goal that remains one
of the top priorities of theoretical physics—then the success of that venture
provides the basis for embracing the theory’s fundamental ontology, regardless
of its spatiotemporal or non-spatiotemporal status. Maudlin himself interprets
Newton’s arguments for absolute space along the same lines, i.e., as an
inference to unobservable entities that effectively explains the phenomena,
just as the atomic hypothesis successfully explains the macrolevel behaviour
of bodies:
[P]hysics is evidently in the business of postulating unobservable
entities in service of explaining observable behaviour. The pos-
tulation is always risky, but, as the atomic hypothesis illustrates,
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the risk can sometimes pay off handsomely. Newton knew that
absolute space and time are not, in themselves, observable, but
he also explained how postulating them could help explain the
observable facts. Why is this any worse than postulating atoms?
[Maudlin 2012, 46]
Well, following the same logic, why is postulating a non-spatiotemporal fun-
damental ontology (from which 4-dimensional spacetime emerges) any worse
than postulating absolute space? Like absolute space, a non-spatiotemporal
QG ontology is unobservable, but, if successful, it also “explains the ob-
servable facts” previously captured, separately, by QM and GR. Yet, by
integrating QM and GR, it would gain a level of empirical support that both
QM and GR lack individually.
Another analogy between a well-known scientific theory or project and the
local beables argument against non-spacetime QG lies in the neurobiological
account of mental phenomena, an analogy that Lam & Esfeld mention as well.
Overall, Berkeley’s idealism, like Descartes’ dualism, stems from a deep-seated
scepticism of the mind’s material origins:
What connextion is there between a motion in the nerves, and the
sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how is it possible
these should be the effects of that? [Berkeley 1979, 45]
In other words, there is a close parallel between the claim that spacetime
cannot emerge from a non-spatiotemporal ontology and the belief that a mind
cannot emerge from a non-mental ontology. Nonetheless, there are few idealists
or dualists among contemporary philosophers of mind, despite the fact that the
mind-brain relationship remains fairly opaque. The available evidence, such
as brain damage impairing mental function, does offer indirect support for
a mind-brain connection; but, presumably, the successful correlation of brain
events and mental events by some future theory will be the only way to counter
the scepticism embodied in the “How can a mind come from a non-mind?”
credo. Similarly, a non-spacetime QG theory that successfully combines QM
and GR, following the guidelines set down by Huggett & Wüthrich above, is
likely the only defence against the local beables argument. As noted above,
Lam & Esfeld likewise mention the mind-body problem while entertaining a
possible supervenience interpretation of non-spacetime QG theories:
[I]f properties of type B (e.g., mental properties) supervene on
properties of type A (e.g., neurobiological properties), one may
in a loose and somewhat misleading sense say that the properties
of type B emerge from properties of type A. [...] Supervenience
implies covariation in the following sense: any variation in type
B-properties necessarily involves a variation in type A-properties.
However, there is no account available how a variation in spatio-
temporal properties could involve a variation in the properties of
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a more fundamental entity that is not spatiotemporal [...]. [Lam
& Esfeld 2013, 292]
But there is no “account available” how a variation in neurobiological
properties could involve a variation in mental properties either. So, assuming
that Lam & Esfeld accept a mind-body link, the failure to provide a successful
supervenience account (or an emergence, causal, or temporal explanation,
as they also discuss) must not undermine the overall plausibility of the
neurobiological hypothesis. Once again, it is the indirect evidence (from,
e.g., brain injuries) in conjunction with the implausibility of the remaining
options (such as idealism and dualism) that is largely responsible for why the
neurobiological hypothesis is the best inference, see, e.g., [Churchland 1988].3
If a particular non-spacetime QG theory were to actually incorporate QM
and GR successfully along the lines set down by Huggett & Wüthrich above,
the lack of a supervenience, or emergence, etc., explanation of the manner by
which a non-spatiotemporal ontology brings about spacetime would similarly
fail to undermine that QG theory’s status as the best inference.
2.3 Structural realism
Besides the dispute over the salience of non-local beables, there is a question
concerning which brand of structural scientific realism, epistemic (ESR) or
ontic (OSR), best corresponds to non-spacetime QG hypotheses. In brief,
ESR takes an epistemological stance on the mathematical structures preserved
over the course of scientific change, i.e., these mathematical structures may,
or may not, provide information on the actual ontology that underlies the
observed structural relationships. OSR, on the other hand, claims that
these invariant mathematical structures actually represent the underlying
ontology in some manner, and, in fact, may be identical to the underlying
ontology. There are many forms of ESR and OSR, it should be added, but
the following discussion will remain within the purview of Lam & Esfeld’s
discussion of this complex topic.
Returning to Lam & Esfeld’s investigation, they associate non-spacetime
QG hypotheses with ESR, but not OSR, insisting that
3. As suggested by a referee, one objection that could be aimed at the analogy
between the mind-body case and the non-spacetime hypotheses is that we have
direct knowledge of brain activity, but we do not have direct knowledge of non-
spatiotemporal entities. However, it is not evidence of brain activity that is crucial
here, but evidence of brain events “bringing about” (causing) mental events (and, it is
not enough to point out that there is evidence of the correlation of brain and mental
events, since a dualist will concede this correlation while simultaneously denying
that it undermines dualism). Nevertheless, the fact that there is evidence of brain
events reveals the limitations of using the brain-mind case as an analogue to the
non-spacetime case (i.e., since there is no evidence, at least as yet, of a realm of
non-spatiotemporal QG entities).
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the structures that OSR admits are concrete physical structures
through their being embedded, implemented or instantiated in
spacetime. Without the commitment to spacetime, it would sim-
ply be unknown as in ESR what the entities are that implement or
instantiate the mathematical structure of the theory in question.
[Lam & Esfeld 2013, 289]
Yet, this assessment prompts the obvious follow-up question: What are the
instantiated entities in spacetime that uphold OSR? As regards QM, which is
the theory that forms the basis of their analysis, ontological interpretations
have long been problematic. Leaving aside QM’s measurement problem, wave-
particle duality, and a host of other mysteries, the evidence is compatible
with both the individuals and non-individuals interpretations of QM, as even
French concedes, hence the ontology of QM seems as indeterminate as QG
[French 2011, 219].4 In brief, if Lam & Esfeld hold that ESR is the proper
categorization for a theory with an “unknown” ontology, then QM should
also qualify as ESR, as opposed to OSR, regardless of its spacetime or non-
spacetime setting. And, in fact, Esfeld would seem to be in league with this
line of criticism [Esfeld 2013], for he concludes that OSR does face major
hurdles as regards the interpretation of QM, i.e., between the many-worlds,
collapse, and hidden-variables approaches, and hence OSR is not, at least at
present, “sufficient to answer the question of what the world is like if quantum
mechanics is correct” [Esfeld 2013, 19].
Furthermore, since OSR’s ontological interpretation seems equivalent to
treating QM’s standard mathematical formalism, group structure, as isomor-
phic to, or a description of, a physical entity, see, [Slowik 2012], an argument
is thus required to explain why the mathematical structures employed by
other theories, including non-spacetime QG theories, cannot qualify as the
hypothesized OSR entity as well. A non-spacetime ontology is still an ontology,
and it possesses a mathematical structure. Put differently: How exactly does
spacetime convert an “unknown” ontology into a “known” ontology? Until this
question is answered, the view that spacetime renders the mathematics of QM
amenable to a scientific realist interpretation would seem to beg the question
against those QG theories that posit non-spatiotemporal entities (from which
spacetime emerges) which also seek a scientific realist construal.
Nevertheless, there is another investigation that apparently sides with
the conclusion that the strategy underlying QG theories is closer to ESR,
although not for the reasons offered by Lam & Esfeld. In [Wüthrich 2012],
an interpretation of structural realism in the context of causal set theory,
a non-spacetime QG proposal, prompts the following assessment: “for the
wholesale structural realist to meet the antirealist challenge, there must be
4. Lam & Esfeld, in fact, cite the Everett interpretation of QM in their analysis
[Lam & Esfeld 2013, 289–290]. But, one might reasonably ask: Is a branching universe
(or spacetime) more ontologically palatable than a fundamental ontology that lacks
the metrical and topological properties of spacetime? Many would, I suspect, demur.
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isomorphisms between substructures of the models of succeeding theories in
the relevant sense in order to underwrite the necessary structural continuity
across scientific revolutions”, where the structural continuity “must manifest
itself in the form of partial isomorphisms between their models, i.e., of isomor-
phisms between [the QM-based] causal sets and substructures of the general-
relativistic spacetimes” [Wüthrich 2012, 239]. Overall, many advocates of OSR
do not take the anti-realist challenge of the pessimistic meta-induction to be
their primary goal, see [Esfeld & Lam 2008, 29], nor do they seem particularly
concerned about structural continuity across scientific revolutions; instead,
their main concern is to provide an ontology that denies the individuality of,
say, quantum particles or spacetime points. Accordingly, despite the fact that
Wüthrich raises concerns for both OSR and ESR [Wüthrich 2012, 226–229],
the quotation above seems much better suited to ESR than OSR—i.e., ESR’s
main goal is to defeat the pessimistic meta-induction via structural continuity
across scientific change, just as Wüthrich counsels.
3 Historical precedents: Ubeity and local
beables
3.1 Leibniz and ubeity
Part of the rationale underlying the “no local beables” accusation against
non-spacetime QG hypotheses almost certainly stems from the assumption
that these types of hypotheses are entirely new and unorthodox contributions
to the debate on spatial ontology. However, the history of speculation on
the ontology of space (spacetime) belies that supposition, for there were a
host of similarly structured hypotheses in the late seventeenth, eighteenth,
and nineteenth centuries that were advanced by the most prominent natural
philosophers of the day, such as Leibniz and the pre-critical Kant. In what
follows, we will focus on Leibniz, since his wide-ranging conception of force
(dubbed “proto-energetics” in [Bernstein 1984, 101]) laid the groundwork for
a school of thought that, ultimately, inspired the development of the energy
concept and the laws of thermodynamics. Indeed, Leibniz’ view that force
was the basis of matter and spatial extension can be seen, in retrospect,
as the forerunner of the type of modern field theories that includes QG
hypotheses; and, to demonstrate this point, a leading QG proponent, Lee
Smolin, has even gone so far as to draw ideas for potential QG hypothe-
ses directly from Leibniz’ theory of non-spatiotemporal, soul-like entities,
i.e., monads, see [Barbour & Smolin 1992].
While Leibniz’ monads can be envisioned as immaterial, soul-like things, it
is also clear from his writings that they play a dual role in his metaphysics as
the ontological foundation of the material world. First, following a conception
popular in his time as regards immaterial entities, monads are not in space:
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he declares that “there is no spatial or absolute nearness or distance among
monads” [Leibniz 1969, 604], and that each monad is “a certain world of its
own, having no connections of dependency except with God” [Leibniz 1989,
199]. Second, matter and space emerge from a non-spatiotemporal monadic
realm that, like QM and QG theories, is more aptly described in terms of force:
a monad is “endowed with primitive power” so that the “derivative forces [of
bodies] are only modifications and resultants of the primitive forces” [Leibniz
1989, 176]. Derivative force, as a value of the primitive force, is also tied to
material extension, which is described as “diffusion”:
the derivative force of being acted upon later shows itself to
different degrees in secondary [i.e., extended] matter. [Leibniz
1989, 120]
the nature which is supposed to be diffused, repeated, continued,
is that which constitutes the physical body; it cannot be found
in anything but the principle of acting and being acted upon.
[Leibniz 1989, 179]
In other words, Leibniz’ monads (like his conception of God, see below)
are not in space per se, but they “bring about” matter and, hence, space:
“[c]ertainly monads cannot be properly in absolute place, since they are not
really ingredients but merely requisites of matter” [Leibniz 1969, 607]; and,
“properly speaking, matter is not composed of constitutive unities [monads],
but results from them” [Leibniz 1989, 179] (see e.g., [Rutherford 1995], for
an extended analysis; and, [Garber 2009, 383–384], who briefly mentions a
similar, particle physics-inspired interpretation).
For all of its connotations with respect to modern physics, the motivation
behind Leibniz’ monadic conception stems from a more general dispute in the
late Medieval and Early Modern periods regarding the relationship between
God and space. Overall, the predominate view in the late seventeenth century
held that space is an emergent effect of a deeper ontological entity, God, who
lacks the spatiotemporal properties manifest at the material level of bodies.
For instance, Gassendi, who linked space directly to God, nonetheless rejected
the idea that God was spatially extended in the normal, metrical sense:
[W]e conceive an infinity as if of extension, which we call [God’s]
immensity, by which we hold that he is everywhere. But, I say
as if of extension, lest we imagine that the divine substance were
extended through space like bodies are. [Gassendi 1976, 94]
Rather, “the divine substance is supremely indivisible and whole at any
time and any place” [Gassendi 1976, 94], an hypothesis that posits a sort
of topological conception of divine presence (since God is only in the points of
space, but not extended across them, see [Slowik 2013]. Leibniz, in contrast,
rejects the view that God is situated in space in either the metrical or
topological sense, although, like Gassendi, God’s immensity grounds space:
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He is the source of possibilities and of existents alike, the one by
his essence and the other by his will. So that space like time
derives its reality only from him, and he can fill up the void
whenever he pleases. It is in this way that he is omnipresent.
[Leibniz 1996, II, xv, 2]
Therefore, Leibniz’ non-spatiotemporal monadic hypothesis is akin to his non-
spatiotemporal notion of immaterial beings, like God.
More specifically, the issues that pertain to the locality of QG entities
would seem to naturally invoke a set of historical parallels with the seventeenth
century’s version of the same dilemma, namely, ubeity, as Leibniz explains in
the New Essays:
The Scholastics have three sorts of ubeity, or ways of being
somewhere. The first is called circumscriptive. It is attributed to
bodies in space which are in it point for point, so that measuring
them depends on being able to specify points in the located thing
corresponding to points in space. The second is the definitive.
In this case, one can “define”—i.e., determine—that the located
thing lies within a given space without being able to specify
exact points or places which it occupies exclusively. That is
how some people have thought that the soul is in the body,
because they have not thought it possible to specify an exact
point such that the soul or something pertaining to it is there and
at no other point. [...] The third kind of ubeity is repletive.
God is said to have it, because he fills the entire universe in
a more perfect way than minds fill bodies, for he operates im-
mediately on all created things, continually producing them [...].
[Leibniz 1996, II, xxiii, 21]
Leaving aside God’s unique ontological role, Leibniz’ inquiry is additionally
concerned with the ubeity of lesser finite entities, such as angels and souls
that—unlike God, but like monads—are not congruent with the whole of
space. It is partially with respect to these finite immaterial entities that
specific comparisons can be made to recent suggestions on how to con-
ceive the locality of QG’s non-spatiotemporal “beables” (entities), as will be
demonstrated in section 3.2.
To recap Leibniz’ discussion, which is based on his own unique interpre-
tation of the Medieval ubeity concept, circumscriptive ubeity maps an entity
to space directly, point by point, so that “measuring them depends on being
able to specify points in the located thing corresponding to points in space”.
In definitive ubeity, “the located thing lies within a given space without being
able to specify exact points or places which it occupies exclusively”, i.e., it
is not “possible to specify an exact point such that the soul or something
pertaining to it is there and at no other point”. Lastly, as regards repletive
ubeity, Leibniz explains that God “operates immediately on all created things,
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continually producing them”. Immediate operation is also linked to the entity’s
absence of spatiotemporal situation:
God is not present to things by situation but by essence; his
presence is manifested by his immediate operation. [Leibniz 2000,
16–17; L.III. 12]
As noted above, there are strong parallels between Leibniz’ concept of God and
his concept of monads—both are posited as non-spatiotemporal foundations
of the spatiotemporal material world—hence one might possibly infer lessons
on the ubeity problem as it pertains to monads from the analysis in the New
Essays quoted above.
3.2 Ubeity and non-spacetime theories
In an attempt to address the local beables issue for those QG hypotheses that
embrace spacetime emergence, Huggett & Wüthrich put forward a detailed
analysis of locality that, quite intriguingly, mirror Leibniz’ interpretation of the
three forms of ubeity (and, in what follows, Leibniz’ understanding of ubeity,
rather than earlier Medieval precedents, will inform our analysis) [Huggett &
Wüthrich 2013]. Starting with circumscriptive ubeity, Huggett & Wüthrich
comment that, on a simple reading of string theory, “it looks exactly as if
strings are local beables, bits of stuff describing worldsheets in a classical
spacetime”, but they go on to add that the duality structure of the later
versions of string theory undermines that conclusion [Huggett & Wüthrich
2013, 280]. Nonetheless, Huggett & Wüthrich’s discussion would seem to
concede that the earliest string theories (first phase, roughly pre-1995), as
well as any other QG strategy with a classical background space (spacetime),
such as the naive covariant quantization techniques and geometrodynamics,
would not violate the demand for local beables either, and hence meet Leibniz’
circumscriptive category.
Turning to definitive ubeity, there is close parallel between the problems
associated with the locality of LQG’s beables, the discrete QM-based spin
networks from which spacetime emerges, and Leibniz’ analysis of the locality
(situation) of finite immaterial beings. A critical obstacle in the development of
LQG has centered on its inability to preserve some notion of adjacency (“next
to” relationship) among spin networks at the emergent level of spacetime. As
described by Huggett & Wüthrich:
[t]he problem is that any natural notion of locality in LQG—one
explicated in terms of the adjacency relationship encoded in the
fundamental structure—is at odds with locality in the emerging
spacetime. In general, two fundamentally adjacent nodes [i.e., of
two spin networks] will not map to the same neighborhood of the
emerging spacetime. [Huggett & Wüthrich 2013, 279]
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Since locality and adjacency in spacetime are topological notions, LQG’s local
beables quandary correlates with Gassendi’s topological conception of God’s
presence—but, focusing strictly on the locality of finite immaterial beings as
mentioned in the New Essays passage, the inability to localize these immaterial
beings in space is analogous to the inability to localize LQG’s spin networks,
e.g., “the located thing [angel, soul] lies within a given space without being able
to specify exact points or places which it occupies exclusively” [Leibniz 1996,
II, xxiii, 21]. In both cases, finite immaterial beings and LQG’s spin networks,
the difficulty is topological in nature and specifically concerns the adjacency
relationship: under Leibniz’ definitive ubeity concept, there is no determinate
adjacency relationship among the “parts” of a soul or angel in space under;
whereas in the case of LQG, adjacent spin networks fail to remain adjacent in
the emergent spacetime.
The third form of ubeity is repletive, where only an entity’s actions or
effects can be situated in space, but not the entity itself. Repletive ubeity,
therefore, is the seventeenth century equivalent of the absence of local beables.
Given all of the parallels disclosed thus far between ubeity and local beables,
it probably should not be surprising that Huggett & Wüthrich’s proposal for a
surrogate notion of locality for those QG theories with the most thoroughgoing
non-spatiotemporal ontology, such as causal set theory, bears an uncanny
similarity with Leibniz’ repletive ubeity: “take localization in causal terms, and
argue that it is causal nexus [among the non-spatiotemporal basal elements],
rather than spatiotemporally understood locality, which supplies the condition
relevant for empirical coherence [of the theory]” [Huggett & Wüthrich 2013,
278]. Just as Leibniz’ God and monads are not situated in space, but God’s
actions and the monads’ “results” (i.e., matter) are situated, so it would seem
that the non-spatiotemporal elements of causal set theory are not spatially
located, but one can obtain a proxy notion of locality via their causal structure.
It is important to point out that the term “causal” as used in this context
pertains to a structural relationship among the basal elements, and not to
the more familiar philosophical notion of causality that is a subject within
metaphysics. In particular, causal structure does not include metric structure
(“[t]here simply is nothing on the fundamental level corresponding to lengths
and durations”), and it cannot “identify ‘space’, in the sense of a spacelike
hypersurface”, or, “[i]n other words, nothing but a difference analogous to that
between spacelike and timelike remains at the fundamental level” [Huggett
& Wüthrich 2013, 278]. At a minimum, maintaining a difference of this
sort would guarantee that, at the foundational level, two basal elements are
distinct and do not overlap, and this restricted form of structural relationship
finds a parallel in the structural relationship among God’s conservation of the
world’s material occupants and the structural relationship among monads.
That is, since God’s effort to maintain each material object would naturally
impose a discrete order among these actions (i.e., for each object), and the
monadic forces that “bring about” matter (and thus space) emanate from
individual monads, the only type of quasi-spatial relationship that can be
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attributed at the foundational level to God’s conservation actions and the
monads themselves would likely amount to a non-overlapping or discreteness
criterion analogous to the quasi-spacelike separation requirement mentioned
by Huggett & Wüthrich with respect to causal set theory’s structure.
In summary, Huggett & Wüthrich’s analysis of the local beables issue
not only correlates with the ubeity system, but their proposals as regards
particular QG theories, e.g., string theory, LQG, and causal sets, also fall under
the specific categories of ubeity, and with respect to the same geometrical
structures, as referenced by Leibniz: circumscriptive/metric with (early)
string theory or naive covariant quantization; definitive/topological with LQG;
and repletive with those QG hypotheses that have more non-spatiotemporal
aspects than LQG, such as causal set theory.
4 Conclusion
In Smart’s popular anthology, Problems of Space and Time, a work that
coincided with the rise of the contemporary movement in the philosophy of
space and time, one finds an early reference to the possibility that the world’s
underlying ontology may be non-spatiotemporal:
It is just possible that we shall come to regard space and time as
statistical properties on the macroscopic level only—just as, for
example, temperature is statistical property on the macrolevel,
which has no meaning in micro-physics. In this case, the particles
of microphysics will be related only by relations which are not
spatio-temporal, and so these particles will bear a remarkable
likeness to Kant’s “things-in-themselves”. [Smart 1964, 16–17]
Whether a successful QG theory would envision emergent space as a “sta-
tistical” property of the underlying ontology is debatable, as is the reference
to Kant’s noumenal world, but the analysis is, nonetheless, prophetic. That
is, at the very start of the modern approach to the philosophy of space and
time, a well-known introductory text suggests a non-spatiotemporal ontology
as a potential candidate, once again demonstrating that these types of physical
theories have always retained a degree of relevance and plausibility.
There are other historical examples of non-spatiotemporal physical on-
tologies that might be cited, of course, such as the unextended point-forces
of the Leibniz-Wolff school (from which space and the material macrolevel
arise), but one of the results of our investigation into ubeity in section 3
should stand out quite clearly by this point—namely, that the emergence of
space, time, and matter from a deeper non-spatiotemporal level of ontology
has played an important role in the history of natural philosophy. These
non-spatiotemporal QG hypotheses will need to be fully developed and their
various problems worked out, of course, and they may very well fail in this
regard, but the criticism directed at their lack of a spacetime backdrop finds
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no support if it is based on the presumption that there are no historical
precedents for this strategy. Returning to the main historical analogy devel-
oped in this essay, it is understandable that philosophers may have misgiving
about employing Leibnizian ubeity in an analogy with contemporary non-
spatiotemporal hypotheses, since the former seems pseudo-scientific. But,
the best way to counter the impression that these seventeenth century non-
spatiotemporal hypotheses are akin to magic or astrology is to historically
connect them with current, widely-accepted scientific (as opposed pseudo-
scientific) hypotheses that are similar in structure and purpose as regards
physical emergence (i.e., leaving aside the mind/soul aspect of these Early
Modern theories while focusing exclusively on the material and spatiotemporal
components of their emergence concepts). As revealed in section 3, there are
close similarities between the Early Modern and QG hypotheses on specific
spatiotemporal properties or features that obtain at the foundational and
derived levels of reality, thus our detailed investigation is justified on these
grounds. Likewise, while the seventeenth century ubeity idea may seem from
our current perspective to be outside the realm of natural philosophy, it was
not judged so by Leibniz and Newton, a realization that demonstrates the
historically-situated, contingent nature of any attempt to label an hypothesis
as pseudo-scientific. Furthermore, many of Leibniz’ ideas, in particular, that
force is essential to matter, have been embraced by modern physics, and so
maybe he was right about the non-spatiotemporal basis of macrolevel material
entities as well.
Finally, to recap one of the themes of the discussion in section 2, the
manner by which a non-spacetime theory gains physical salience seems com-
mensurate with the way other theoretical entities in different physical theories
have achieved that same status, whether it is the atomic hypothesis or the
neurobiological basis of the mind. That is, just as a material body seems to
have properties (color, solidity, etc.) that are not possessed by its sub-atomic
constituent elements (protons, electrons, neutrons, which are neither colored
nor solid), so it is possible that the macrolevel spatiotemporal structure of the
world is an emergent feature of a hidden realm of entities that possess radically
different spatiotemporal properties. As Huggett & Wüthrich have argued,
moreover, the case against these non-spatiotemporal hypotheses, whether
advanced by Maudlin or Lam & Esfeld, begs the question; and, if one of
these hypotheses were indeed to successfully incorporate QM and GR, then
the rationale for accepting a non-spatiotemporal realm of QG entities would
be extremely difficult to dismiss.
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